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In recent years, monitoring the compliance of business processes with relevant regula-
tions, constraints, and rules during runtime has evolved as major concern in literature and
practice. Monitoring not only refers to continuously observing possible compliance
violations, but also includes the ability to provide fine-grained feedback and to predict
possible compliance violations in the future. The body of literature on business process
compliance is large and approaches specifically addressing process monitoring are hard to
identify. Moreover, proper means for the systematic comparison of these approaches are
missing. Hence, it is unclear which approaches are suitable for particular scenarios. The
goal of this paper is to define a framework for Compliance Monitoring Functionalities
(CMF) that enables the systematic comparison of existing and new approaches for
monitoring compliance rules over business processes during runtime. To define the scope
of the framework, at first, related areas are identified and discussed. The CMFs are
harvested based on a systematic literature review and five selected case studies. The
appropriateness of the selection of CMFs is demonstrated in two ways: (a) a systematic
comparison with pattern-based compliance approaches and (b) a classification of existing
compliance monitoring approaches using the CMFs. Moreover, the application of the CMFs
is showcased using three existing tools that are applied to two realistic data sets. Overall,
the CMF framework provides powerful means to position existing and future compliance
monitoring approaches.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Business process compliance emerged as hot topic in
research during the last few years. In essence, severaler Ltd. This is an open acce
M. Montali),approaches have been developed to formally and (semi-)
automatically prove that business processes comply with
relevant constraints such as regulations, laws, or guidelines.
An example constraint from the medical domain would be
“The patient has to be informed about the risks of a surgery
before the surgery takes place”. In practice, compliance
checks are often conducted manually and hence perceived
as a burden [1], although their importance is undoubted.
The need to check for compliance of business processes
based on a set of constraints may emerge in differentss article under the CC BY license
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the compliance of a process model with a set of constraints
is checked. At runtime, the progress of a potentially large
number of process instances is monitored to detect or even
predict compliance violations. For this, typically, terms such
as compliance monitoring or online auditing are used.
Finally, processes can be diagnosed for compliance viola-
tions in a post mortem or offline manner, i.e., after process
instance execution has been finished.
This paper is dedicated to compliance monitoring as this is
crucial for the timely detection and prediction of compliance
violations as well as for the provision of reactive and pro-active
countermeasures on compliance violations [4–6]. Further, in
realistic settings, the existence of a complete process model for
compliance checks cannot always be assumed. In fact, business
processes are often implemented in a rather implicit manner
and executed over different information systems (e.g., Enter-
prise Resource Planning (ERP) or Customer Relationship Man-
agement (CRM) tools) as depicted in Fig. 1. Although there are
similarities between design time/post mortem analysis and
compliance monitoring (see also Section 3.1.5), this paper will
focus on the latter in order to provide a clear scope.
Typically, compliance requirements on business pro-
cesses stem from different sources such as laws, regulations,
or guidelines that are often available as textual descriptions.
An important task towards compliance monitoring is the
interpretation of these requirements as compliance objec-
tives and the subsequent specification as compliance rules
or constraints (note that, in this paper, we will use both
terms interchangeably). As shown in Fig. 1, the specified
compliance rules will be verified over the process execution
events. The results of compliance monitoring can be visua-
lized and reported back to users in different ways, ranging
from notifications on violations to fine-grained feedback on
reasons for violations, or even the prediction of possible and
unavoidable future violations.
In general, compliance monitoring approaches are driven
by two factors: (1) the compliance rule language that is used
to specify the compliance requirements and (2) the event
format the compliance checks are based on. Due to the
possible heterogeneity of the data sources employed, an
integrated target event format is desirable.
1.1. Problem statement
There is a overwhelming body of literature on business
process compliance. The approaches address different phasesCompliance requirements 
Interpretation
Compliance objectives
Compliance rules / constraints Monito
E
CRM
WfMS
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Fig. 1. Compliance monitoring for businof the process life cycle and often propose different lan-
guages. These are used to formally represent the constraints
to be checked on the business processes. Overall, it is hard to
oversee and compare the already existing approaches and
hence, the decision of which approach could be utilized for
which kind of problem is hampered.
Hence, the main challenge tackled in this paper is to
provide proper means for comparing approaches for com-
pliance monitoring in business processes in a systematic
way. This challenge will be addressed by the following four
research questions. The first one refers to the challenge of
identifying approaches for compliance monitoring and to
distinguish them from approaches that provide design time
compliance checks, post mortem conformance checking,
compliance checking architectures, or mention compliance
monitoring as an important building block
(↦ Research Question 1 (RQ1): How to identify compli-
ance monitoring approaches?).
This is important to provide the study with a clear focus.
The second research question fosters the derivation of a
set of typical functionalities required in compliance mon-
itoring approaches and practice
(↦ Research Question 2 (RQ2): What are functionalities
that are essential for compliance monitoring approaches in
business processes?).
RQ2 meets the challenge of granularity and coverage.
The challenge of how to demonstrate the appropriate-
ness of the identified functionalities is picked up by the
third research question
(↦ Research Question 3 (RQ3): How can we demonstrate
the appropriateness of the identified compliance monitoring
functionalities?).
The fourth research question asks for the applicability
of the functionalities
(↦ Research Question 4 (RQ4): How can the compliance
monitoring functionalities be applied in existing tools?).
Section 1.2 discusses the applied methodology and
gives an overview on how RQ1 to RQ4 will be tackled in
this paper.
1.2. Research methodology
The goal of this paper is to define a framework for
Compliance Monitoring Functionalities (CMF) that enables
the systematic comparison of existing and new approaches
for monitoring compliance rules over business processes
during runtime. Specific challenges for eliciting the CMFsring engine Visualization / reporting
vents
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Fig. 2. Methodology for the elicitation, design, and realization of CMFs (in BPMN notation).
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business process compliance and the decision of which
functionalities are required in real-world scenarios. In
order to address these challenges, we apply the methodol-
ogy depicted in Fig. 2.
The methodology consists of three phases, i.e., elicita-
tion, design, and realization of the CMF framework.
Phase 1—Elicitation: The elicitation phase follows the
research methodology described in the context of elicita-
tion of process change and time patterns [13,14]. First of
all, selection criteria are defined that scope the research
done in this paper (↦ RQ1 and RQ2). As overarching
selection criteria, we focus on:1. functionalities that are relevant for process compliance
monitoring, i.e., the observation and enforcement of
compliance constraints that are imposed over business
processes during runtime and2. constraints that are imposed at the process level, i.e., we
exclude, for example, integrity constraints [15].
The elicitation phase includes a systematic literature
review described in Section 3.1 and an analysis of five case
studies from different domains introduced in Section 3.2. The
CMF identification is based on the results of the systematic
literature review and the case study analysis (↦ RQ2) and
possibly illustrated by additional examples.
Phase 2—Design: The CMF design itself is presented in
Section 4. Each CMF is described using a CMF template and
illustrated by examples taken from literature or case
studies (↦ RQ2).
Phase 3—Realization: In order to demonstrate the appro-
priateness of the CMF design, existing approaches are classi-
fied along their support for the CMFs (cf. Section 4).
Moreover, constraint patterns as suggested by the literature
are compared to the CMFs proposed in this paper (↦ RQ3).
Finally, to illustrate the application of the CMF framework,
compliance rules are extracted from two realistic and publicly
available data sets. Based on the extracted rules and the data
sets we showcase the application of compliance monitoring
for business processes in existing tools (cf. Section 5.3)
(↦ RQ4). Note that the data sets for CMF application are
different from the case studies utilized for CMF elicitation.1.3. Contribution
In this paper, we address research questions RQ1 to
RQ4 as stated Section 1.1. The core of the approach is aframework of functionalities that are relevant in the
context of compliance monitoring. These Compliance Mon-
itoring Functionalities are denoted as CMFs for short. The
CMF Framework (CMFF for short) shall enable a systematic
comparison of existing as well as new approaches on
compliance monitoring in business processes. In summary,
the main contributions of this paper are A systematic literature review on compliance monitor-
ing approaches in business processes and analysis of
selected projects from different domains (↦ RQ1 and
RQ2).nn A framework (CMFF) based on 10 compliance monit
oring functionalities described in a systematic way
(↦ RQ2).n A comparative survey of typical compliance rule pat-
terns found in the literature highlighting the impor-
tance of the selected CMFs (↦ RQ3). A detailed analysis and discussion of compliance mon-
itoring approaches based on the CMFF (↦ RQ3).nn The application of the CMFF using existing tools and
two realistic data sets (↦ RQ4).
The n and nn annotations of selected contributions high-
light the extensions made on the previous EDOC 2013
conference paper [10]. Here, n means that the contribution
is based on [10] and nnmeans an extension of the particular
contribution when compared to [10]. Contributions without
annotations are entirely new.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2, a short introduction to compliance monitoring
in the context of process mining is provided. Section 3
describes the research methodology followed and discusses
approaches that are closely related to compliance monitor-
ing. Section 4 describes our CMFF composed of ten CMFs. In
Section 5, we focus approaches to concretely support CMFs.
First of all, a comparison of the CMFF with pattern-based
approaches is presented. Furthermore, existing compliance
monitoring approaches are classified using the CMFs.
Finally, the application of the CMFF based on two realistic
data sets within three selected tools is showcased. Section 6
concludes the paper.2. Compliance monitoring in the context of process
mining
The basic idea behind process mining is to discover,
monitor and improve processes by extracting knowledge from
Table 1
Literature review: horizontal search.
Keywords for search hits selected Selection criteria
Process compliance monitoring 13 8 Refers to business processes
Compliance monitoring 813 8 Refers to business processes
Compliance checking 139 11 Refers to business processes and runtime
Compliance audit[ing] 299þ137 3þ0 Refers to business processes and runtime
Online auditing 37 2 Refers to business processes and compliance
Runtime compliance 3 2 Refers to business processes
Conformance checking 159 5 Refers to business processes, compliance and runtime
Business process compliance 121 28 Refers to runtime, monitoring
Monitoring business constraints 4 3 Refers to processes and compliance
Results horizontal search: 1605 70 http://www.wst.univie.ac.at/communities/ComMon/
Added papers 1 [17] Clear focus on process compliance monitoring
Removed papers 18 Design time, no language requirements, not referring to process constraints
Results vertical/backward search:
Added papers 9 [18–27]
Overall: 60
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point for process mining is an event log. XES (eXtensible Event
Stream) [7,8] has been developed as the standard for storing,
exchanging and analyzing event logs. Each event in a log
refers to an activity (i.e., a well-defined step in some process)
and is related to a particular case (i.e., a process instance). The
events belonging to a case are ordered. Hence, a case can be
viewed as a sequence of events (i.e., a trace). Event logs may
store additional information about events such as the resource
(i.e., person or device) executing or initiating the activity, the
timestamp of the event, or data elements recorded with
the event.
The reference framework presented in [99] gives an
overview of the process mining spectrum. The event logs
are partitioned into two kinds: pre mortem and post mortem.
Pre mortem logs refer to current process instances that are
ongoing; post mortem logs refer to historical process ins-
tances that have completed. The framework also distin-
guishes two types of models: de jure and de facto. A de jure
model is normative, i.e., it specifies how things should be
done or handled. A de facto model is descriptive and its goal
is not to steer or control reality; instead, de facto models aim
at capturing reality.
Moreover, ten process mining related activities are identi-
fied in [99], which can be grouped into three categories:
cartography including discover, enhance, and diagnose; audit-
ing including detect, check, compare, and promote; navigation
including explore, predict, and recommend.
Compliance monitoring corresponds to the detect activ-
ity as defined in [99]: the de jure models would serve as
representations of the compliance constraints and are
hence used to analyze the pre mortem logs. Diagnostics
are provided to the user if the behavior in the logs is in
some way different from the one specified in the models,
i.e., detects deviations at runtime (auditing) [99]. An
enabling technology for the detect activity is conformance
checking. Conformance checking and related techniques are
introduced in Section 3.1.5 together with a discussion on
their differences to compliance monitoring approaches.3. Compliance Monitoring Functionality (CMF) elicitation
The elicitation of the CMFs corresponds to Phase 1
depicted in Fig. 2. To this end, we systematically reviewed
literature (Section 3.1) and analyzed five case studies
(Section 3.2).
3.1. Literature review
After defining the selection criteria, the first input for the
elicitation of CMFs is compiled from a systematic literature
review. With some adaptations, we follow the procedures
for systematic literature reviews as proposed in [16].
3.1.1. Research identification
The search for the primary literature is driven by RQ1: How
to identify compliance monitoring approaches? (cf. Section 1).
RQ1 can be met by defining the following selection criteria for
the search: (a) compliance monitoring on business processes
and (b) constraints that refer to process activities. This will be
reflected in the keywords searches as well as in processing the
literature found.
3.1.2. Selection of primary works (horizontal search):
The search was conducted using scholar.google.com (last
access 20 February 2014). In a first step, keywords were
searched in the titles of the papers, excluding patents and
citations. Table 1 summarizes the results of the horizontal
search. It states the searched keywords in the first column,
the number of hits in the second, the number of selected
papers of the primary search in the third, and the criteria for
selecting these papers in the fourth column. If, for example, a
paper containing keywords compliance monitoring in its title
was found, we checked whether this paper refers to business
processes as well. Overall, we aimed at finding all papers that
combine the aspects business process, compliance, and mon-
itoring. This was important to guide the horizontal literature
search while keeping a clear focus. Note that more keywords
L.T. Ly et al. / Information Systems 54 (2015) 209–234 213and combinations were checked than stated in Table 1,
however, these keywords and the resulting references are
only displayed if at least one paper was found and selected.
Overall, the horizontal literature search resulted in 70
references out of 1605 hits. The respective list of references
is available at http://www.wst.univie.ac.at/communities/
ComMon/.3.1.3. Processing of primary literature list
The list of references resulting from the horizontal
search was evaluated in a first round excluding papers that1. are clearly geared towards design time aspects;
2. do not refer to requirements on the compliance speci-
fication language;
3. do not refer to constraints at the business process level,
but to more low level integrity constraints such as
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) or calculating Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs).
Obviously, the first filter criterion led us to loose design-
time approaches that can be potentially lifted to runtime
analysis. This is the case, for example, of [79]. On one hand,
we wanted to isolate as sources for our investigation only
those approaches that are natively developed for dealing
with compliance monitoring. On the other hand, we
believe that the CMF framework here presented can serve
as the basis for assessing in which design-time approaches
are indeed apt to be used at runtime.
For the backward search, the reference lists of the papers
presenting a compliance monitoring approach for business
processes were analyzed. Moreover, we identified papers that
provide surveys on business process compliance approaches
such as Becker et al. [28] and validated our search results
against these articles by comparing the references. This
resulted in adding one reference, namely [18]. Moreover, the
backward search led to interesting references in the context of
Web Services, i.e., [19,20,24,25,29]. Here it is important to
distinguish approaches that concentrate on SLAs (and are not
further considered) and approaches that apply compliance
monitoring at a process level (i.e., based on a Web Service
orchestration) that should be considered. Finally, the back-
ward search resulted in replacing primary paper [30] by more
specific papers, i.e., [26,27] as well as primary paper [29] by
[21–23]. This step was conducted using the name of the
provided tools (MONPOLY in the case of [30] and Dynamo in
case [29]) and by going through the papers of the authors. In
summary, we extended the primary list by 62þ5¼ 9
references.
The systematic literature analysis resulted in 60 papers.
They were analyzed and synthesized as described in the
next section.3.1.4. Data synthesis
The results from the first and second round of the
literature review were analyzed in two rounds; first of all,
by assigning each paper to a researcher, followed by a
group discussion on all 60 papers. For each paper, it was
checked whether it1. provides a compliance monitoring approach for busi-
ness processes [17,18,21–24,26,27,31–42],2. includes studies on process compliance patterns [43–46],
3. provides enabling technologies and related techniques
for process compliance monitoring, e.g., conformance
checking [47–51],4. provides frameworks for compliance monitoring infra-
structure [52–54] or contract monitoring [55,56], or5. features domain-specific approaches such as from
health care, providing requirements, examples, and
case studies [57,58].
Categories 1–5 are processed in the course of the paper
as follows (if none of the categories applied then the paper
was discarded from further processing):1. The “core” compliance monitoring approaches in busi-
ness processes were carefully analyzed and classified
using the defined CMFs (see Table 7).2. The compliance pattern approaches are compared to
the CMFF (see Tables 4–6).3. Enabling technologies and related techniques are dis-
cussed in Section 3.1.5.4. Frameworks for compliance monitoring infrastructure
are discussed in Section 3.1.6.5. Domain-specific approaches are analyzed examples
and discussed in Section 3.1.7.
In the remainder we first discuss Categories 3–5, before
describing the CFMs. This helps to position our work.
3.1.5. Enabling technologies and related techniques
We briefly survey research approaches that, although
not directly focused on compliance monitoring, can be
used either as enabling technologies or as techniques for
tackling this problem.
At first, relevant line of research is concerned with
conformance checking. Although the usage of the two terms
of conformance and compliance is not homogeneous in the
literature, in the Business Process Management (BPM) set-
ting conformance checking is typically understood as the
problem of comparing an existing process model with an
event log, so as to understand how far the event log reflects
the behavior set out by the process model and, in the case of
discrepancies, to measure to what extent they diverge. A
number of approaches have been proposed to tackle this
problem, see, e.g., [47–49]. The two main differences
between conformance checking and compliance monitoring
are the kind of model used to analyze the logs (conformance
checking usually involves a complete model of the process),
and the tackled phase in the process lifecycle (conformance
checking is typically applied post mortem) [45]. Despite
these two differences, there is a lot of potential in the
interaction between these two areas. In particular, observe
that many of the conformance checking techniques could be
actually lifted to runtime. Furthermore, the fine-grained
comparison metrics used in conformance checking to assess
how much the input model and log deviate from each other
have the potential to extensively contribute to CMF 10 (cf.
Section 4.3).
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compliance monitoring is that of stream data management.
In broad terms, stream data management focuses on the
management of data received as a continuous, real-time
sequence of items [96]. The relevance of stream data
management for compliance monitoring covers both the
querying and the event gathering aspects.
As for querying, part of stream data management deals
with query languages, techniques, and tools for stream data,
to suitably mediate between the expressiveness of queries and
the efficiency of answering. Since such queries are posed
against dynamically acquired data, they usually involve tem-
poral operators that can be used to compare and correlate
data across time. In this light, those approaches that tackle
compliance monitoring by just analyzing the trace of events
accumulated so far, without reasoning on the possible future
outcomes, can be seen as a special form of query answering
over stream data, where the data stream delivers data about
the monitored cases, while compliance rules are formulated
as special queries. We consider the investigation of these
synergies as one of the most interesting lines of research for
the future.
As for event gathering, stream data management comes
with principles, techniques, and tools for processing a
stream of (raw) data produced by multiple, possibly hetero-
geneous sources, so as to extract, analyze, and infer mean-
ingful events from it. This specific area of research is called
Complex Event Processing (CEP) [95]. CEP frameworks are
able to iteratively clean, refine, correlate, and combine low-
level events into abstract, higher-level events. Since com-
pliance monitoring focuses on business-level events, CEP
can be considered as an enabling technology for compliance
monitoring in all those situations where business-level
events are not directly generated by the monitored system,
but can be obtained by suitably aggregating low-level
events. In addition, CEP can support compliance monitoring
in all those large-scale systems where an extremely large
amount of events must be analyzed with tight real-time
requirements [52–54].
3.1.6. Frameworks for compliance monitoring infrastructure
In this category, we find works that do not propose a
specific technical approach for compliance monitoring, but
address the problem of implementing a general architecture
or infrastructure for compliance monitoring in the literature.
These approaches particularly address the challenge of bring-
ing different perspectives of compliance management toge-
ther. The development of a compliance management archi-
tecture is a focus of the COMPAS project. In [97], Mulo et al.
propose a systematic method of realizing a compliance
monitoring infrastructure in a process-driven SOA. Compli-
ance of a business process instance is determined by monitor-
ing controls applied to the activities of the process. It provides
a domain-specific language that enables the definition of
single or groups of activities to be monitored. For such
activities, conditions for monitoring directives can be defined.
The conditions may comprise filters to narrow down the
amount of particular activity instances that need to be
considered by a monitoring component (e.g., only credit
worthiness checks with a loan amount exceeding a threshold
are to be monitored). Further, conditions are associated withassertions that specify expected values of monitored data
(e.g., a certain role is expected for credit worthiness checks
with a loan amount exceeding a threshold). If assertions are
not fulfilled, a compliance control is violated. Being model-
driven, the framework further foresees patterns for translating
compliance monitoring statements specified in the DSL into
code, such as queries, that can be processed by specific
compliance monitoring engines. In their prototype implemen-
tation, Mulo et al. provide templates for generating queries for
the Esper event processing engine. This separates the SOA
concerns from the technical compliance monitor and ensures
the replaceability of the CEP engine employed. In [52], Awad
et al. introduce a framework for implementing an approach
addressing compliance monitoring. It is exemplified for
Separation of Duty (SoD) requirements how the framework
provides support along the process of implementing compli-
ance monitoring from the definition of compliance require-
ments in controlled natural language to the translation into
checkable constraints. The framework relies on CEP for
aggregating significant process events (e.g., a completed travel
request). Such events may trigger constraints. Constraints are
associated with conditions referring to data, resources or roles
to be checked (e.g., checking whether SoD is ensured) and
actions to be scheduled when conditions apply (e.g., blocking
the process execution).
3.1.7. Domain-specific approaches
Middleton et al. [57] and Stevovic et al. [58] address
compliance monitoring in the health care domain. In [57],
the authors present requirements on providing compli-
ance monitoring functionalities, but more at a technical
level such as a common and extensible data model. In [58],
the authors utilize business processes as a means to define,
implement, and monitor security and privacy policies in
sharing Electronic Health Records (EHR). Domain-specific
compliance monitoring approaches are not further inves-
tigated, but analyzed for examples to illustrate the CMFs.
3.2. Harvesting compliance functionalities from selected
case studies
Next to our literature review, we used various case studies
to assist in the elicitation of CMFs. For harvesting compliance
functionalities, in a first step, we analyzed the compliance
constraints relevant in five case studies. The case studies were
chosen because they cover a diverse set of different domains
and we had access to the project data. Table 2 summarizes the
details. The number of harvested compliance constraints
might seem to be low for some projects at first sight.
However, some of the compliance constraints are very com-
plex. For example, the European skin cancer guideline in the
“EBMC2” project requires a textual description of more than
ten pages and entails different CMF functionalities in a single
guideline.
4. Compliance Monitoring Functionality (CMF) design
This section presents our CMFF, i.e., the framework of
Compliance Monitoring Functionalities (CMFs). Following the
methodology set out in Section 3, we derived CMF candi-
dates from a systematic literature review and five case
Table 2
Case studies.
Domain Project URL Reference
Health care “EBMC2” ebmc2.univie.ac.at [59,60]
Manufacturing Adventure www.fp7-adventure.eu [61]
Higher education HEP www.wst.univie.ac.at/communities/hep/ [62]
Maritime safety Poseidon [63]
IT project management SeaFlows www.seaflows.de [64]
Table 3
CMFF: requirements and CMFs.
Modeling requirements CMF 1: Constraints referring to time
CMF 2: Constraints referring to data
CMF 3: Constraints referring to resources
Execution requirements CMF 4: Supporting non-atomic activities
CMF 5: Supporting activity life cycles
CMF 6: Supporting multiple instances constraints
User requirements CMF 7: Ability to reactively detect and management
CMF 8: Ability to pro-actively detect and manage violations
CMF 9: Ability to explain the root cause of a violation
CMF 10: Ability to quantify the degree of compliance
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dates were then cleaned and aggregated into the ten CMFs
proposed in this paper. Each CMF is described using the
following template listing the name, a brief overview on the
CMF, a description, guidelines about the evaluation crite
ria, examples, and implementation hints of compliance rules
illustrating their functionality. Whenever possible we dire
ctly borrow the examples from literature or the projects.
Sometimes we also provide new examples to highlight
specific features of the CMFs.
Moreover, the following requirements for CMFs were
identified that also serve as basis for classifying the ten
presented CMFs in the following (cf. Table 3). Such req
uirements tackle the three main dimensions of any CMFF:
(a) modeling of compliance constraints, (b) analyzing the
raw data at runtime, and (c) generating compliance
monitoring results to be returned to the end users.1. Modeling requirements A compliance monitoring approach
has to enable the specification of compliance constraints that
can bemonitored. The CMFs of this class refer to the ability of
compliance monitoring approaches to express constraints
not only on the control flowof a business process, but also on
other, equally important, perspectives. This helps in classify-
ing CMFFs with respect to their modeling capabilities, and to
position their adequacy in a specific domain with its own
compliance constraints to be formalized.2. Execution requirements Compliance monitoring approaches
should deal with execution-based information attached to
the events of the event stream to be monitored. In general,
an event is always related to an activity in a business
process, but further information can be also provided. For
example, an event can be associated with information
related to the activity life cycle or activity data. The CMFs of
this class refer to the ability of compliance monitoring
approaches to process domain-related information at the
event level only available at execution time. As such, eventhough these requirements are not necessarily tailored to
regulatory compliance, they must nevertheless be consid-
ered when developing a CMFF. In fact, they characterize
the nature of input data to be processed by the monitoring
component, and if input data are not understood and
analyzed properly, then there is no guarantee about the
meaningfulness of the results produced by the monitoring
facility. For instance, if the input data are events tracking
the execution of non-atomic activities, the monitor must
be able to reconstruct the notion of activity properly from
the raw, processed events.3. User requirements The third dimensions focus on the
ability to return the compliance assessment to the end
users. Specifically, advanced diagnostics and recommen-
dations relate to the ability of a CMFF to provide
advanced, meaningful information to end users that
go beyond violation detection and explanation. For
example, it could be useful for the end-users to not
only know why a certain rule has been violated, but
also what they should have done instead in order to
correctly continue the execution. If this kind of analysis
is done after a violation has taken place, then we
classify it as a form of advanced diagnostics. If, instead,
the analysis is carried a priori, to suggest measures for
preventing inevitable violations, then we talk about
pro-active recommendations. Clearly, the latter is parti-
cularly relevant when a compliance rule is still in a
violable state.
4.1. Modeling requirements
The following three CMFs refer to the ability of a compli-
ance monitoring approach to deal with constraints that
address aspects beyond control flow: time, data, and resources.
CMF 1: Constraints referring to time.
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rules involves a combination of multiple activities or events
in time. Hence, time is obviously one of the most important
dimensions that a compliance rule language must tackle.
Description: Time-related conditions within compliance
monitoring constraints may be qualitative or quantitative
(i.e., metric time). This determines how temporal entities
can be related to each other. A qualitative notion of time
supports the comparison between temporal entities without
referring to their actual distance. Typical qualitative temporal
patterns are “before” and “after”. Such temporal relations are
utilized, for example, to capture the fundamental ordering
between events constrained by a compliance rule. In contrast
to qualitative time constraints, metric (or quantitative) time
constraints specify the distance between time entities. Metric
constraints typically refer to deadlines, delays and latency
constraints in compliance rules [14,39].
Evaluation criteria: To fully support this functionality,
the approach must be able to monitor qualitative and
quantitative time-related conditions.
Examples: (Qualitative time) For payment runs with amounts
beyond €10;000, the payment list has to be signed
before being transferred to the bank and has to be filed
afterwards for later audits [35]. (Qualitative time) When an investor receives an
amount of money, she becomes in charge of eventually
investing it in bonds or in stocks and she cannot receive
money anymore before the investment. [37]. (Quantitative time) For Stage 1A patients, an appoint-
ment for sonography has to be made within 12 months
(European Skin Cancer Treatment guideline [60]). (Quantitative time) A passenger ship leaving Amster-
dam has to moor in Newcastle within 16 h [63].1 Note that other data patterns like scope and block data are too fine-
grained in the compliance monitoring setting as it is not known, when
monitoring a trace, which were the original notions of blocks/scopes.(Quantitative) If employing any electronic storage
media other than optical disk technology (including
CD-ROM), the member, broker, or dealer must notify its
designated examining authority at least 90 days prior
to employing such storage media [33].
Implementation: We briefly discuss the case of atomic
timestamps, which are associated to a point-based algebra
(see CMF 4 for a discussion on durative time entities).
Temporal logics such as LTL, CTL* and μ-calculus [65] all adopt
an inherent qualitative notion of time. Thus, they easily capture
qualitative temporal relations such as “before” or “after”. If not
already inherent, such temporal relations can be introduced to
the compliance rule language as the semantics of these
relations can be defined over execution traces (and their
linear/branching future). When metric times come into play,
two approaches are typically followed for their representation:
an implicit approach, embedding them inside temporal opera-
tors (like in real-time logics such as MTL and TLTL [66]) or an
explicit approach, where explicit time variables are introduced
and subject to arithmetic constraints (like in extensions of logic
programming such as the Event Calculus [67]).
CMF 2: Constraints referring to dataOverview: Compliance rules often not only define con-
straints on activities or events but also contain conditions
on data processed in a business process.
Description: Data refer to the ability of the compliance
rule language to not only target the control-flow aspect,
but also the data aspect. This leads to data-aware com-
pliance rules that can include constraints, requirements
and expectations about data objects and their values.
For what concerns the constraints' shape, a major distinc-
tion can be drawn between unary data conditions that just
involve a single data object and extended conditions that
possibly relate multiple data objects at the same time. Unary
data conditions take the form d  v, where d is some data
object,  is a comparison operator and v is some value of d's
domain. Extended data conditions express comparisons bet-
ween multiple data objects, e.g., comparing the values of data
element temperature measured at two different activities
within a business process. According to the classical data-
related workflow patterns [68], we can further distinguish
between different sources of data, namely activity data,
i.e., data taken as input or produced by the activities of a
business process and case data, namely data that are asso-
ciated to a whole process instance and can be accessed/
manipulated by all activity instances executed inside the
case.1
Evaluation criteria: To fully support this functionality, the
approach must be able to monitor unary data conditions
and extended data conditions over activity and case data.
Examples: (Activity data) If the PainScore of patient p is greater
than 7 and the status is uninitialized then the status
must be changed to initialized and a timer event is
generated to treat patient p within 1 h. (This rule is
based on a formal description in [57].) (Case data/extended data condition) If a vessel (case) is
of type fishing boat, the size of the boat is above 25 m
(100 tons) and it is located at 541 of latitude and 8.51 of
longitude, it cannot be engaged in fishing [63]. (Unary data condition) In case the total number of users
permissible on the server has reached the limit, access
privilege to current potential user requires exception
approval from IT administrator [40]. (Comparison of multiple data objects) If the first test
terminates with a particular result code, then all the
consequent executions of the test should return the
same result code. (Comparison of multiple data objects) Any [LightPathO-
peration (LPO)] ID appearing in any partition request
must be different from any LPO ID appearing in any
future concatenate request [24].
Implementation: Data-aware compliance rule languages
typically employ variables to denote data objects and
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ence lies then in the domains of the data objects, as well as
in the “shape” of such constraints. In order to support
data-aware compliance rules, the corresponding compli-
ance monitoring approach must be able to evaluate the
truth of data conditions. This necessitates access to respec-
tive data sources within the process runtime environment.
CMF 3: Constraints referring to resources
Overview: Compliance constraints often relate to orga-
nizational resources involved in the business process.
Description: Compliance rules often involve not only the
control-flow and the data perspective but also the organiza-
tional perspective of a business process. This is particularly
true for compliance rules stemming from legal sources.
Resource-related conditions in compliance rules can be con-
sidered a special case of data-related constraints where the
data refers to the resources involved. This is because resource-
related information is often represented as case or activity
data. Resource-aware compliance rules include constraints,
requirements and expectations on resources (e.g., agents or
roles) ass;ociated with activities or events. Similar to data-
related constraints, we can distinguish between unary resource
conditions expressing expectations on specific resource proper-
ties in isolation and extended resource conditions relating
multiple resources.
Evaluation criteria: To support this functionality, the
approach must be able to monitor unary resource condi-
tions and extended resource conditions.
Examples: (Unary resource condition) The bank must verify the
identity of each customer, using the information obtained
in accordance with the above requirements, within a
reasonable time after the account is opened [33]. (Unary resource condition) Orders of more than 1000€
can only be approved by a senior manager. (Extended resource condition) Final approval of the
assessment can only be granted by the manager that
requested the assessment. (Extended resource condition) Every closed project must
be validated by a person who did not participate in the
project. (4-Eyes principle, also called Separation of Duties
(SoD).)
Implementation: Depending on the particular event model
and the process runtime environment, constraints on resources
may be dealt with in a similar manner as data-related con-
straints. Clearly, the evaluation of resource-related constraints
requires access to resource information (such as originators,
roles, groups) during process execution. This is supported by
the XES organizational extension [7] (cf. Section 1).
4.2. Execution requirements
There are several requirements imposed on compliance
monitoring approaches by the domain. The following
CMFs enable the assessment whether or not a compliance
monitoring approach meets these requirements.CMF 4: Supporting non-atomic activities
Overview: Activities in a process may be non-atomic,
i.e., may have a duration. Hence, compliance rule lan-
guages must also support non-atomic activities.
Description: Non-atomic activities are durative activities
whose execution spans across a time interval. While the
execution of an atomic activity is associated to just a single
event attesting that an instance of the activity has been
“done”, non-atomic activities are associated to multiple
events and to a lifecycle that disciplines the allowed order-
ings among such events. The lifecycle contains at least the
two event types start and complete. Moreover, often addi-
tional event types such as suspend, resume, abort are possible
[8]. Compliance rules dealing with non-atomic activities
follow either an explicit approach, talking about their multi-
ple, atomic constitutive events, or an implicit approach,
where the activities are mentioned as such without referring
to their events. If the approach is explicit, the definition of
compliance rules is similar to what can be done with atomic
activities (now mentioning the atomic constitutive events of
each activity). However, if the approach is implicit it is
necessary to match the implicit semantics of the rules with
the information provided in the actual data where activities
are distributed over multiple events.
Evaluation criteria: To fully support this functionality,
the approach must be able to monitor explicit or implicit
conditions on non-atomic activities.
Examples: (Explicit) An order creation cannot be completed until
the customer registration is completed. (Implicit)Activity check project can be executed only
while the project is under preparation. (Implicit) Activities First Medical History and Excision
Melanoma must not overlap [59].
Implementation: Implementations differ depending on
whether the explicit or implicit approach is adopted. With
the explicit approach, the monitoring frameworkmust be able
to handle at least two types of information about each event:
the activity it refers to and its type, which must be one of the
event types constituting the activity lifecycle (start, complete,
suspend, resume, abort, etc.). Since the language directly
tackles these constitutive atomic events, it typically relies on
a point-based algebra to relate their relative position in time.
The implicit approach directly targets activities and assumes
that the time windows corresponding to their (non-atomic)
executions can be reconstructed from the monitored event
stream. Since the compliance rule language predicates in this
case over durative temporal entities, it relies on an interval
algebra (such as the one by Allen [69]) to relate the execution
of different activities over time. See [70] for a survey on
temporal reasoning.
CMF 5: Supporting activity lifecycles
Overview: Non-atomic activities are associated with a
lifecycle defining the allowed orderings of the constitutive
events. Suitable monitoring mechanisms should be pro-
vided to check whether this lifecycle is indeed followed.
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executions of atomic, correlated events that together
describe the execution of non-atomic activities over time.
In particular, the lifecycle lists the states in which an
(instance of a) non-atomic activity can be at a given time,
the constitutive events that mark a step in the execution, as
well as in which states such events may happen, and to
which state they lead. This latter aspect implicitly defines the
allowed orderings of the constitutive events. The lifecycle is
therefore mostly captured by a state chart (cf. ADEPT [71] or
iUPC [72]). In general, multiple, independent executions of
the same activity (i.e., activity instances) can occur inside a
case. Each such instance corresponds to an instance of the
activity lifecycle. A proper correlation mechanism is required
to correctly manage the progressions of each lifecycle ins-
tance and, in particular, to associate a given event to the right
corresponding lifecycle instance. For example, if two starts of
some activity and two completions of the same activity occur
during a case, it is necessary to identify to which start event
each completion event refers. From the monitoring point of
view, (meta-)rules capturing the activity lifecycle and its
instances can be used to check whether the activity execu-
tions contained in a given trace indeed comply with the
expected lifecycle constraints.
Evaluation criteria: To fully support this functionality, the
approach under study must capture the activity lifecycle
and implement a correlation mechanism between events.
Note that the correlation of activity instances builds on the
correlation of process instances (cases). Within the same
process instance, there may be multiple instances of the
same activity.
Examples: (Activation) A start event creates an activity instance and
puts it into the active state [7,9]. (Completion) Each completion event moves its associated
activity instance to the completed state, provided that the
instance is currently active [7,9]. (Balance start/complete events) For every activity
instance, each start event has a single corresponding
completion or cancelation event [7,9].
Implementation: Implementations of this CMF are pos-
sible if the compliance rule language supports:1. the notion of “state”, and
2. a correlation mechanism between events.Out-of-order events can either be ignored, or managed by
putting the corresponding activity instance into a special
“error” state, pointing out that a deviation from the
expected lifecycle has been detected. Correlation can be
realized by providing a special parameter used to identify
the corresponding activity instance. This way, two events
carrying the same identifier are recognized to be part of
the same lifecycle. Events carrying different identifiers but
referring to the same activity correspond to potentially
parallel lifecycle instances.CMF 6: Supporting multiple-instances constraints
Overview: There may be multiple instances of the same
compliance rule in a trace due to multiple, possibly parallel
occurrences of the involved activities. Monitoring at the
constraint instance level allows for tracking fine-grained
compliance rules.
Description: When compliance rules are able to express
requirements about time (CMF 1), data (CMF 2), and/or
resources (CMF 3), the same compliance rule can be
activated multiple times, as multiple events referring to
the activities targeted by the rule occur, each with its own
timestamp, data and resource information. In fact, each of
such events provides a specific “context” for the compliance
rule. This context is then used to instantiate the temporal/
data/resource conditions possibly associated with the com-
pliance rule. Consider, for example, the rule stating that
every time an order O is closed by the client, then order O must
be eventually delivered by the warehouse. Clearly, the con-
straint is instantiated for each specific closed order and each
instance has its own evolution depending on events specific
for this order. For example, it could happen that two orders
are closed but only one is delivered. In this case, two
instances of the compliance rule should be generated by
the monitoring framework, then judging one of them as
satisfied and the other one as violated. A more detailed
discussion on multiple instances handling can be found in
[35,39].
Evaluation criteria: To support this functionality, the
approach must be able to monitor multiple instances,
where the notion of instance is substantiated using tem-
poral and/or data and/or resource-based conditions.
Examples: (Multiple instances based on timestamps) Every final
submission has to be corrected within 6 weeks. Here,
every submission cycle termination creates an instance of
the compliance rule determined by its time stamp t; the
instance then checks that the correction occurs between t
and tþ6, assuming a granularity of weeks [62]. (Multiple instances based on data and resources) The
carbon footprint of a supplier must not exceed a value of
x. Depending on the number of suppliers modeled as
resources, the constraint is instantiated multiple times. If
suppliers can be added during runtime, the number of
constraint instantiations will increase accordingly. (The
carbon footprint is one of the non-functional optimiza-
tion parameters in the ADVENTURE project [98]. The
rule can be derived from the combination of optimiza-
tion of multiple process instances with dynamic selec-
tion of partners as provided in ADVENTURE).
Implementation: Supporting multiple instances of a
compliance rule requires mechanisms to discriminate
between different rule activations. This can be achieved
by precisely characterizing which information (time, data,
resources) contributes to define the “context” of the rule
(see the examples below) and which are the events that
create separate instances of the rule by filling this context
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associated with a separate compliance state in order to
assess compliance at the rule-instance level.
4.3. User requirements
The CMFs described in this section refer to the ability of
a compliance monitoring approach to address user
requirements.
CMF 7: Ability to reactively detect and manage compli-
ance violations
Overview: If a violation is detected by the compliance
monitoring approach, it could simply report it and provide
no further support. Once the behavior is non-compliant and
this is irreversible, the monitor may take the viewpoint that
no further support is needed. However, a compliance
monitoring approach may accommodate a variety of addi-
tional advanced features (besides detection) to continue the
monitoring after a violation takes place, give feedback to
the user and suggest compensation actions.
Description: In the context of reactive detection and
management of compliance violations, these factors can be
exploited to characterize the degree of support provided
by a compliance monitoring approach: Detection, the ability to detect compliance violations.
 Feedback, the ability to provide detailed compliance
reports (see CMFs 9 and 10).
 Continuous monitoring, the ability to continue monitor-
ing after a violation.
 Recovery and compensation mechanisms, used to react
to a violation with proper countermeasures.
Evaluation criteria: To support this functionality, first of
all, the approach must be able to detect a compliance
violation and provide an intelligible compliance report. In
addition, the approach should be able to guarantee con-
tinuous monitoring, i.e., it should be able to continue the
compliance monitoring after the violation has happened.
This can be supported, for example, by implementing
recovery and compensation mechanisms in the case of
compliance violations. This can comprise automatic and
semi-automatic treatment of violations.
Examples: (Continuous monitoring) Generally, the patient has to
formally confirm that she has been informed about
risks prior to invasive treatments. If this is not the case
(e.g., in emergency cases), this has to be documented
and the patient has to be informed about the treatment
risks afterwards (contrary-to-duty obligation). This con-
straint requires the ability of continuing the monitor-
ing, even after the compliance constraint has been
violated by not informing the patient prior to the
invasive treatment. If the PainScore of patient p is greater than 7 and the
status has not been initialized yet, then the status must
be changed to initialized and a timer event is generated
to treat patient p within 1 h. If there is no response
within 1 h, a response warning is sent and anothertimer event for 1 h is set. (This rule is based on a formal
description in [57]). The example shows that even if the
compliance constraint is violated for the first time, a
strategy for continuing the monitoring is defined.)
Implementation: As for recovery and compensation, an
added feature of the compliance rule language is the ability
of dealing with violations. An event violating a rule can be
used to contextualize it, making the rule active only when
some violation takes place. This kind of rule represents a form
of recovery or compensation, which introduces further con-
straints/requirements upon a violation. This can be realized,
for example, by introducing notions like contrary-to-duty
operators [73] or reparation chains [79] in the compliance rule
language. Approaches that query the partial execution trace
for certain event patterns, such as [42,35], typically do not
have difficulties with continuing after detecting a violation.
However, continuous monitoring can be a challenge for logic-
based approaches (e.g., [74]) as the approach must be able to
tolerate inconsistencies to continue monitoring after a viola-
tion occurred. In [37], the authors introduce some recovery
capabilities to realize different strategies for continuous mon-
itoring showing that automata-based approach are also able
to accommodate sophisticated recovery mechanisms.
CMF 8: Ability to pro-actively detect and manage
violations
Overview: While recovery and compensation measures
may be applied when detecting a violation, the violation
itself cannot be undone. To prevent possibly costly com-
pensation on non-compliance, a compliance monitoring
approach should be able to provide support to pro-actively
detect and manage possible compliance violations.
Description: Pro-active support includes detecting possible
and unavoidable future violations and mechanisms for pre-
venting violations. Future violations are violations whose
source is not yet explicitly contained in the trace. They can
be detected by implicit violations caused by currently conflict-
ing rules. The presence of conflicting rules identifies violations
that cannot be revealed by considering each compliance rule in
isolation, but only by merging the contribution of two or more
compliance rules. The early detection of such future compli-
ance violations enables timely preparation of recovery and
compensation actions. Support for preventing violations refers
to the ability of a compliance-monitoring framework to
provide assistance for complying with imposed rules before
compliance violations become manifest. This comprises, for
example, predictions and recommendations of activities to be
executed next in order to preserve compliance.
Evaluation criteria: To support this functionality, the
approach must implement mechanisms for the early detec-
tion of conflicting conditions or provide the user with
recommendations about what to do next to avoid violations.
Examples: (Early detection of a violation) Every time an order is
delivered, the warehouse must be replenished. If the
replenishment truck is broken, the warehouse cannot
be replenished. Consider an execution where the truck
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detect conflicts among rules would in this case point
out an (implicit) violation: the first constraint requires
a replenishment and the second forbids it. (Proactive support to comply) Conducting a payment
run creates a payment list containing multiple items
that must be transferred to the bank. Then, the bank
statement must be checked for payment of the corre-
sponding items. For payment runs with amount beyond
10,000 €, the payment list has to be signed before being
transferred to the bank and has to be filed afterwards
for later audits. For a concrete payment run with an
amount beyond 10;000€, the monitoring system can
deduce from the constraints that two activities (namely
sign the payment list and file the payment list) are
pending and need to be executed to comply. This can
be exploited for ensuring that the pending tasks are
scheduled and for preventing the transfer of the pay-
ment list to the bank unless it has been signed. (Predictions and recommendations) Requests for building
permits need to be handled within 3 months. Based on
historic information, i.e., comparing a request currently
being handled with earlier requests, one can predict the
remaining processing time. A counter measure is taken if
the predicted remaining processing time is too long.
Implementation: Future violations as described can be
detected when considering the interaction of all imposed
compliance rules. A typical task is evaluating whether the
compliance rules are not conflicting a priori, i.e., that thewhole
set of rules admits at least one compliant execution trace.
However, compliance rules that are not conflicting in
general may still become conflicting at some point during
the process execution. Thus, checking of compliance rules
at design-time or per individual constraint, is not sufficient
for detecting all types of future violations. It should be
noted that supporting such implicit violations can become
quite costly and the cost grows with the amount of rules
involved. For expressive compliance rule languages, this
becomes even undecidable.2 The identification of suitable
decidable compliance rule patterns for data- and time-
aware compliance rules is still an open challenge.
To avoid violations in a running process instance, it is
also possible to give recommendations about what to do
next by exploiting complete cases stored in event logs
(e.g., using process mining techniques [99]) or by analyz-
ing the prevailing obligations to satisfy compliance rules.
CMF 9: Ability to explain the root cause of a violation
Overview: Key to the practical application of a compliance
monitoring approach is its ability to pinpoint the root cause
of a compliance violation beyond providing the2 A precise characterization of which combinations of constructs lead
ndecidability of monitoring is outside from the scope of this work.
ertheless, observe that from the logical point of view, conflict
ection requires the ability to check satisfiability of compliance rules
he presence of a partial execution trace. Hence, as soon as data are
perly taken into account, that is, compliance rules adopt first-order
ic or relational algebra to query the event data, then satisfiability is
rly undecidable even without considering the temporal dimension.counterexample that resulted in the violation. This is parti-
cularly true when a compliance rule can be violated in
multiple ways or multiple rules are involved in a violation.
Description: Root-cause analysis enables to diagnose the
root cause of a compliance violation, e.g., by isolating the
responsible event occurrences or the involved compliance
rules. Note that this kind of analysis is far from trivial and
sometimes could lead to multiple possible explanations or
to no explanation at all. Consider, for example, the case of
a sequence of events that culminates in the expiration of a
deadline: isolating the responsible events in this case is
impossible in general. Similarly, as discussed in [38] there
can be multiple sets of compliance rules that are involved
in a violation at the same time and therefore fine-grained
analysis is needed to identify the minimal set(s) of con-
flicting rules. Beside the root cause analysis itself, it is also
of utmost importance to provide suitable ways for com-
municating the result of the analysis to the end users in a
comprehensible and intuitive manner [35].
Evaluation criteria: To support this functionality, the
approach must implement mechanisms for root cause
analysis and support their effective communication.
Examples: (Root-cause of a violation within one rule) When a
patient is diagnosed with cryptorchidism, an operation
must be performed either through laparoscopy or with
an open surgery but not both. This rule can be violated
in two different ways (can have two different root-
causes), i.e., no operation is performed or both laparo-
scopy and open surgery are performed in the same case. (Root-cause of a violation involving multiple rules)
Typically each warehouse order undergoes a sequence
of three steps: preparation, packaging, transportation
via a conveyer belt. A domain constraint states that
when the conveyer belt breaks, it cannot accomplish
the transportation task anymore. Even though there is
no direct incompatibility between the “belt broken”
event and the preparation of the order, if both occur,
this will cause a violation.
Implementation: For future research, efforts should be
taken to provide diagnostics and pro-active recommenda-
tions based on the identification of the root cause of a
violation. So far this is only supported by few approaches
[35,38,75].
CMF 10: Ability to quantify the degree of compliance
Overview: Compliance metrics and indicators should be
employed by a monitoring framework to provide aggre-
gated feedback to the users, summarizing the detailed
information computed for each compliance rule.
Description: The practical feasibility of a compliance
monitoring approach also relies on its ability to give practi-
tioners a sense of the compliance situation. For that, crisp
approaches associating two possible truth values to each
compliance rule, representing whether it is satisfied or
violated, is not sufficient. In contrast to crisp compliance
characterization, fuzzy approaches allow for a range of values
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with respect to a compliance rule. In this respect, we
differentiate between approaches that discretize the possible
truth values from approaches that adopt continuous distribu-
tions between 0 (violation) and 1 (satisfaction).
Evaluation criteria: To support this functionality, the
approach must be able to characterize the “healthiness” of
a running trace through metrics. Advanced support is
provided by an approach that is able to derive statements
about the health of the whole process/system by evaluat-
ing multiple running traces, i.e., by determining the frac-
tion of deviating traces.
Examples: (Metrics) A vessel cannot be not under command, a
vessel with one occurrence of not under command is
more “healthy” than a vessel with nine occurrences of
not under command [63].3 For a detailed discussion on the semantical differences between an
infinite-trace and a finite-trace settings, see, e.g., [77,78].
4 Note that the patterns A fully segregated from B, A bonded with B,
and A fully bonded with B may be enforced at design time by assigning
activities to roles accordingly provided that the process-aware informa-
tion system supports this. However, it is possible to cheat, for example, if
different roles are assigned to the same person [52]. Therefore, monitor-
ing these constraints at runtime may still become necessary.(Fuzzy) A passenger ship leaving Amsterdam has to
moor in Newcastle within 16 h. It is desirable to judge
with different degrees of violation a ship arriving in
Newcastle after 16 h and 10 min and a ship arriving in
Newcastle after 18 h [63].
Implementation: A typical approach to quantify the degree
of compliance is to “count” the number of violations and
devise meaningful metrics that give a measure about the
overall compliance degree of a running process instance. This is
particularly effective when multiple instances are managed
(cf. CMF 6). More fine-grained metrics can be devised by using
detailed information about individual violations. Approaches
using a continuous scale need to calculate a “degree” of
compliance, rather than simply providing a yes/no answer.
For example, in the case of a deadline, a matching function
could assign different noncompliance weights to traces miss-
ing the deadline, depending on the amount of time that
passed between the deadline and the (late) event occurrence.
5. Compliance Monitoring Functionality (CMF)
realization
This section is concerned with Phase 3 CMF Realization of
the methodology depicted in Fig. 2. Phase 3 consists of three
building blocks, i.e., a pattern-based comparison of CMFs
related to language aspects with compliance patterns set out
in the literature (cf. Section 5.1), a classification of existing
monitoring approaches using the CMF framework (cf.
Section 5.2), and the application of the CMFF in selected
tools (cf. Section 5.3).
5.1. Common compliance rule patterns and the CMF
framework
We provide a brief, comparative survey about some of
the most typical compliance rule patterns found in the
literature, so as to concretely substantiate the relevance of
the language-related CMFs, namely CMFs 1–4. It is worth
noting that the vast majority of the literature takesinspiration, for such patterns, on a catalog of temporal
logic specifications typically employed in model checking
[76]. The semantics of such patterns are not exactly the
same, though: while [76] follows the standard infinite-
trace semantics for dynamic systems, compliance rule
patterns are typically meant to be checked against a partial
trace whose continuation will be finite.3
Specifically, Tables 4 and 5 summarize typical patterns
related to the control-flow dimension of compliance rules. The
tables respectively tackle the (co-)occurrence and relative
orderings between activity executions, substantiating the
need for qualitative time constraints (cf. CMF 1). In fact, each
of the listed patterns express requirements on the expected/
forbidden execution of atomic activities over time, but with-
out expressing metric constraints over the corresponding
timestamps. Extensions of patterns in Table 5 with metric
time have been studied in [39,74,81,82], supporting the need
for quantitative time constraints as well (cf. CMF 1 again).
Furthermore, it is not surprising that such patterns have
been also extended with non-atomic activities (cf. CMF 4),
given how much widespread they are in BPM [80,74,39].
Data (cf. CMF 2) have been also considered in combination
with patterns of the forms shown in Tables 4 and 5, see
[39,83–86]. Differently from data and non-atomic activities,
dedicated resource-related patterns (cf. CMF 3) are men-
tioned in [43,82]. It is interesting to notice that, as argued in
CMF 3, not only unary resource conditions, but also extended
resource conditions are present. Extended conditions are in
fact necessary to relate and compare performers of different
activities in a compliance rule.4
Finally, observe that, from the expressiveness point of
view, the resource patterns in Table 6 can be re-expressed
using the data-aware extensions of [39,84–86]. This can be
done by introducing special data slots tracking activity
originators, and adding specific conditions on them. How-
ever, from the modeling perspective data and resources
have a different nature. This is why they are separately
tackled by two different CMFs.5.2. Classification of compliance monitoring approaches
We classified compliance monitoring approaches using the
ten CMFs presented in this paper. We focused on compliance
monitoring approaches that mainly address compliance
checks during the process execution. These approaches are
different from other approaches that can be used in other
phases of the process lifecycle such as process design
(e.g., [90]) or compliance constraint modeling (e.g., [1,91])
and trigger specific questions. For example, monitoring is
carried out with actual data and by considering finite, evolving
prefixes of event traces.
Table 4
Typical compliance rule patterns dealing with the (co-)occurrence of activities.
Pattern Description References and Synonyms
Existence of A A must be executed at least once (Global Scope) Existence [43,81,88], Exists [82]
Absence of A A cannot be executed (Global Scope) Absence [43,81,88], Absent [82]
Limit A to N A can occur at most N times Absence N [81,88], Limit repetitions [43], Bounded existence [45]
A requires B If A occurs, then also B must occur Responded Existence [81,88], CoExists [82], Inclusive [45]
A coexists with B Either A and B both occur, or none of them does Coexistence [81,88], CoRequisite [45,82]
A mutex B A and B cannot both occur Not Coexistence [81,88], Exclusive [82]
Choose A or B At least one between A and B must occur Choice [81,88]
ChooseA xor B Either A or B must occur, but not both Exclusive Choice [81,88], MutexChoice [82]
Table 5
Typical compliance rule patterns dealing with orderings between activities.
Pattern Description References and Synonyms
A followed by B Whenever A occurs, B must occur afterwards Response [81,88], After Scope Existence [43], LeadsTo [82]
A precedes B B can occur only if A occurred before Precedence [81,88], Before Scope Existence [43], Always
precedes [43], Precedes [82]
A blocks B Whenever A occurs, B cannot occur afterwards Negation succession [81,88], After Scope Absence [43]
A blocks B until C Whenever A occurs, C must occur afterwards, and B is
forbidden in between
Alternate response (with B¼A) [81,88], Between Absence [43]
A immediately
followed by B
Whenever A occurs, B must occur next Chain response [81,88], XLeadsTo [82]
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fied based on the degree of detail on concepts provided in
publications. In fact, a certain degree of detail (for exam-
ple, in the used compliance rule languages) is necessary to
properly classify the approaches through our framework.
The results of the classification are shown in Table 7,
where “”, “þ” and “þ/” indicate functionalities that are
not supported, supported and partially supported from the
conceptual viewpoint, respectively. A rating of “n.a.” indi-
cates that the CMF cannot be assessed based on the
analyzed literature. The scores shown in bold refer to
approaches where the implementation is publicly available.
The first ten approaches as summarized in Table 7 are
discussed in this section. The approaches proposed by the
authors, namely MobuconEC, MobuconLTL, and SeaFlows,
will be described in detail in Section 5.3 in order to
showcase the implementation of CMFs along two data sets.
The detailed description of the classification results
starts with the framework described in [17] which is based
on Supervisory Control Theory. This approach allows for the
definition of constraints on resources but, in general, it does
not support data conditions. Through this approach, it is
possible to supervise the process-aware information system
by “blocking” those events that would lead to a violation.
This can be considered as a very sophisticated form of pro-
active violation management, which is applicable only
when the process-aware information system can be (at
least partially) controlled by the monitor. Since violations
are prevented, the framework does not directly consider the
problem of reactive management nor violation explanation.
ECE rules [31] are a domain-independent approach that
was not specifically tailored for business process monitoring.
Therefore, functionalities like support for case data and
activity life cycle were simply not investigated (this is matter
of ongoing work). ECE rules can deal with both atomic and
non-atomic temporal entities, capturing qualitative andmetric time constraints, as well as point-based and interv
al-based ones. Two key features characterize ECE rules. First,
they support an imperfect (i.e., fuzzy and probabilistic)
matching between expected and occurred events and hence
deal with several fine-grained degrees of compliance. Sec-
ond, expected events can be decorated with countermea-
sures to be taken in the case of a violation, hence providing
first-class support for compensation mechanisms.
With BPath [42], Sebahi proposes an approach for querying
execution traces based on XPath. BPath implements a frag-
ment of first-order hybrid logic and enables data-aware and
resource-aware constraints. Quantitative time is supported by
referring to and comparing timestamps of events. This enables
sophisticated time constraints. Due to the querying nature of
this approach, it is able to distinguish between multiple act-
ivations of the same compliance rule. However, the approach
still lacks support for advanced diagnostics and pro-active
compliance management. These issues do not seem to be in
the focus of thework. A compliance degree could be calculated
from the results provided by this approach. The prototypical
implementation of BPath is also presented in [42].
An approach based on constraint programming is provided
in [34]. As time aspects play a crucial role in this approach,
CMF 1 is a focal issue in this approach. The approach also
explicitly addresses the duration of activities. The main goal of
[34] is to pro-actively detect compliance violations and to
explain the root cause of the violation. The constraint satisfac-
tion problem for the example provided in the paper has been
implemented. However, there is no prototypical implementa-
tion of a compliance-monitoring framework.
Giblin et al. [33] present an approach based on Timed
Propositional Temporal Logic for transforming high level
regulatory constraints into REALM constraints that can be
monitored during process runtime. [33] explicitly elabo-
rates on temporal constraints, hence addressing CMF 1. As
the main focus of the paper is on the transformation and
Table 6
Typical compliance rule patterns dealing with resources.
Pattern Description References and Synonyms
A performed by R A can be performed only by users playing role R PerformedBy [82],
A segregated from B A and B must be performed by different users USegregatedFrom [82], 4-Eyes Principle [43]
A fully segregated from B A and B must be assigned to different roles, and different
users must perform them
SegregatedFrom [82]
A bonded with B A and B must be assigned to the same role, but different
users must perform them
RBondedWith [82]
A fully bonded with B A and B must be assigned to the same role, and the same
user must perform them
BondedWith [82]
Table 7
Classification of monitoring approaches using the CMFF.
APPROACH CMF 1 CMF 2 CMF 3 CMF 4 CMF 5 CMF 6 CMF 7 CMF 8 CMF 9 CMF 10
time data resources non-
atomic
lifecycle multi-
instance
reactive
mgmt
pro-active
mgmt
root
cause
compl.
degree
Superv. Control Theory
[17]
þ/  þ þ þ   þ  
ECE Rules [31] þ þ/ þ þ   þ  þ/ þ
BPath (Sebahi) [42] þ þ þ þ þ/ þ þ   þ/
Gomez et al. [34] þ   þ n.a. þ/ þ þ  
Giblin et al. [33] þ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. þ n.a. n.a. n.a.
Narendra et al. [40]  þ þ n.a.  þ þ   þ
Thullner et al. [41] þ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. þ   n.a.
MONPOLY [26,27] þ þ þ þ/ þ/ þ þ   
Halle et al. [24] þ/ þ þ/ n.a. n.a. n.a. þ n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dynamo [21–23] þ þ þ/ þ n.a. þ þ   þ/
Namiri et al. [18] þ/ þ þ þ  þ þ   
MobuconEC [39] þ þ þ þ þ þ þ   þ/
Mobucon LTL [36–38] þ/   þ   þ þ þ þ/
SeaFlows [35] þ/ þ/ þ/ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ/
Caption: þ supported, þ implementation publicly available, þ/partly supported, not supported, n.a. cannot be assessed.
5 This would require to compute satisfiability of MFOTL formulae,
which is already undecidable even without considering the temporal
dimension.
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paper. The paper presents architectural considerations and
an implementation of the transformation on the basis of a
case study.
Narendra et al. [40] address the problem of continuous
compliance monitoring, i.e., they evaluate the compliance of
a process execution with respect to a set of policies at
runtime. In particular, the policies are checked when some
specific tasks are executed, which are called control points.
The authors define an optimization problem to find the right
balance between the accuracy of the compliance checking
and the number of control points (each control point has a
verification cost). They define policies in terms of first order
clauses and their framework can support data- and resource-
based rules. There is no notion of time. The framework
supports a reactive violation management and not a pro-
active violation management. The ability of the framework to
detect the root cause of a violation cannot be assessed based
on this paper. The authors, however, define metrics to
evaluate the degree of compliance of a process instance.
Thullner et al. [41] define a framework for compliance
monitoring able to detect violation and to suggest possible
recovery actions after the violation has occurred. The
framework is focused on the detection of different types
of time constraints. A violation is handled after it has
occurred and, in this sense, the framework support CMF 7but not CMF 8. The other CMFs cannot be assessed based
on this paper.
MONPOLY [26,27] is a runtime verification framework
for security policies, specified in the logic MFOTL, a variant
of LTL-FO with metric time. Monitorable formulas are those
of the form “Always Φ”, where Φ is a so-called bounded
MFOTL formula, i.e., a MFOTL formula that can be evaluated
within a bounded number of steps in the future. The high
expressiveness of MFOTL allows one to express sophisti-
cated compliance rules involving advanced temporal con-
straints, as well as data- and resource-related conditions.
Consequently, even though non-atomic activities and their
lifecycle are not explicitly tackled by the approach, they
could be properly accommodated. The monitoring algo-
rithm, described in [27] and implemented in the publicly
available MONPOLY tool [26], supports continuous monitor-
ing, in that it fetches all the time points at which a violation
is detected. Due to the high expressiveness of MFOTL, no
advanced features related to pro-active management of
violations can be supported.5
6 www.processmining.org
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“LTL-FOþ is a linear temporal logic augmented with full
first-order quantification over the data inside a trace of
XML messages” [24] that focuses on monitoring data-
aware constraints over business processes. The data is part
of the messages that are exchanged between the process
activities. The approach can handle unary and binary data
conditions. As time and resources can be handled based on
data, the approach is also able to deal with CMF 1 and CMF
3, although these CMFs are not explicitly mentioned in the
paper. Based on [24], CMF 4–10 cannot be assessed.
The work by Baresi et al. on Dynamo [22] constitutes one
of the few techniques and tools dealing with monitoring
(BPEL) Web Services against complex rules, going beyond the
analysis of quantitative KPIs for service-level agreement. In
Table 7, we use (Timed) Dynamo to identify the combination
between Dynamo and the following languages: timed
WSCoL [21] to specify the rules to be monitored, and WSReL
to specify the recovery mechanisms to be put in place when
given violations are detected [23]. (Timed) Dynamo allows
one to model ECA-like rules that mix information about the
location (i.e., the target Web Services and operations), the
involved data, and qualitative/quantitative temporal con-
straints. Location-related aspects can be considered as refer-
ring to resources in a business context, but since the focus is
on interacting Web Services, there is no support for more
advanced resource-related aspects such as groups and roles.
Timed WSCoL supports the correlation between messages,
and is thus able to deal with non-atomic activities, but being
focused on Web Service message exchange, no notion of
activity lifecycle is considered. Dynamo provides continuous,
reactive monitoring facilities based on the messages fetched
so far, with sophisticated recovery and compensation mec-
hanisms based on WSReL. Furthermore, the monitoring
results can be aggregated and reported to the user, providing
useful insights that go beyond a yes/no answer.
In [18], Namiri et al. describe an approach that is based on
the patterns proposed by Dwyer and Corbett [76]. In
particular, the authors introduce a set of control patterns.
Control patterns are triggered by events (such as the execu-
tion of a controlled activity). When being trigged, conditions
associated with the control are evaluated. In order to provide
data for evaluating the associated conditions, Namiri et al.
introduce a semantic mirror that is filled with runtime data
of a process instance. For each control, actions to be carried
out if a control fails may be specified (CMF 7). However, root
cause analysis (CMF 9) and pro-active support (CMF 8) are
not addressed. Being based on [76], the approach is restricted
to a predefined set of patterns. Data (CMF 2) and resource
(CMF 3) constraints are supported as conditions to be
evaluated once a control becomes triggered. This corre-
sponds to evaluating a query on process data. Metric time
(CMF 1) is, however, not addressed. Furthermore, the
approach does not incorporate a notion of activity lifecycle
(CMF 5). As events may occur multiple times within a
process execution, there may be multiple activations of a
control (CMF 6). Using the semantic mirror, non-atomic
events (CMF 4) can be supported using this approach. An
implementation of the approach is also described in [18].
Specifically, controls are implemented as ECA rules, which
are evaluated by Drools.As can be seen from Table 7, the majority of approaches
focus on time aspects (CMF 1) and reactive management of
compliance violations (CMF 7). This is not astonishing since
time constitutes an important requirement in many applica-
tion domains. In this paper, we have looked at constraints
from the health care, the financial, and the maritime safety
domain. However, in many other domains the adherence of
time constraints and their violation is an important matter, e.
g., in logistics. Intuitively, each approach should support at
least one of CMF 7 and 8, i.e., provide reactive and / or
proactive management of compliance violations. Interest-
ingly, Supervisory Control Theory [17] is the only approach
that supports the proactive management, but not the reac-
tive management of compliance violations. This is the case
since events that will lead to violations (proactive) are
blocked before they actually occur. All other approaches
enable the detection of violations when they occur (reactive).
Overall, it can be stated that there are approaches that
can deal with modeling requirements, i.e., incorporate
time, data, and resource aspects. When it comes to execu-
tion requirements such as supporting multiple constraint
instances, less approaches are available that support all of
the related CMFs, i.e., CMF 4–6. However, the least number
of approaches addresses user requirements such as CMF
7–10. For example, only few approaches enable the expla-
nation of the root cause of a compliance violation. As the
user requirements are often of particular importance, e.g.,
if medical staff has to react on compliance violations in
stressful situations, it would be desirable to put more
research effort on user feedback and support in dealing
with compliance violations during run time.5.3. Application of CMFs in selected tools
In Section 5.2, we classified existing compliance mon-
itoring approaches using the CMFF. This was done based
on the information in publications. For approaches
assigned a “þ” or “þ/” for a CMF, the concrete imple-
mentation of this CMF may still vary. Thus, it will be
interesting to also have a look at the application of CMFs in
the tool implementations. The authors of this paper
proposed three approaches, namely MobuconEC, Mobu-
conLTL, and SeaFlows, that make use of different techniques
to enable compliance monitoring. In the following, we
showcase the application of the ten CMFs in these three
tools. As these are the tools we know best, it is ensured
that we are able to correctly apply the tools in a case study
for discussing the implementation of CMFs.
In order to analyze tools using the CMFs, a data set
consisting of compliance rules covering the CMFs to be
investigated and process instances (or process logs for
replaying process instances) are necessary. We selected
the Business Process Intelligence Challenge (BPIC) data sets
from 2011 and 2012. Using the process-mining tool ProM,6
we were able to derive, from these data sets, a set of
compliance rules that covers all language-related CMFs. To
apply the CMFs, we applied the tools to check compliance of
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BPIC data.
Since the BPIC data sets contain post-mortem data
about complete execution traces, we used a “log replay”
component so as to feed the tools with an evolving stream
of data that recreate the real executions. This technique
makes post-mortem data indistinguishable from truly
runtime data. Notice that our aim is to assess the tool
functionalities in relationship with the CMFs, and not to go
into the details of non-functional aspects such as reaction
time and performance-related insights. For such details,
please refer to [38,39].
5.3.1. Data set
Since 2011, the BPI Workshop features an initiative
called International Business Process Intelligence Challenge
(BPIC). The idea is that an event log is provided with some
background information and points of interest. Research-
ers and practitioners participate in a competition in which
they are asked to test, apply or validate whatever techni-
que or tool they developed using this log. In 2010, the
three universities of technology in The Netherlands joined
forces in erecting the 3TU Datacenter. This initiative aimed
at publicly sharing datasets such that other researchers
can benefit from whatever data can be collected. The BPIC
aims at making the research community aware of the
existence of these datasets.7
The constraints used for analyzing the tools were
extracted from the logs provided for the BPIC 2011 [11]
and 2012 [12]. The first event log pertains to the treatment
of patients diagnosed with cancer in a large Dutch aca-
demic hospital. It contains 1143 cases and 150,291 events
distributed across 623 activities. Each case in this event log
is related to a different patient treated in the hospital. The
event log contains domain specific attributes, e.g., Diag-
nosis code, Treatment code, Producer code, Diagnosis Treat-
ment Combination ID, and Age in addition to the standard
XES attributes for events: concept:name, lifecycle:transition,
time:timestamp, and org:group [7].
The second event log was recorded for an application
process for personal loans or overdrafts in a Dutch finan-
cial institute. It merges three intertwined sub-processes.
Therefore, in each case, events belonging to different sub-
processes can occur. The log contains 262,200 events
distributed across 36 activities and includes 13,087 cases.
The amount requested by the customer for a loan is
indicated in the case attribute AMOUNT_REQ. In addition,
the log contains the standard XES attributes.
5.3.2. Methodology
In this section, we illustrate the methodology we have
followed to show how the CMFs have been implemented
in the selected tools. We started from the data sets
described in Section 5.3.1. Fig. 3 illustrates the methodol-
ogy. We have split the logs in two parts (Log Part 1 and Log
Part 2). For the hospital log, in the first part, the first 571
cases are considered. In the second part, the rest of the
cases (572 cases) are included. For the financial institute7 http://fluxicon.com/blog.log, in the first part, the first 6543 cases and, in the second
part, the rest of the cases (6544 cases) were considered.
Then, we have mined Log Part 1 (training log) to extract a
set of compliance rules. To do this, we have used the
Declare Miner component of the process-mining tool ProM
[92]. This allows us to automatically discover compliance
rules related to control-flow, data and resources based on
the mainstream observed behavior, i.e., frequent behavior
is converted into a collection of Declare constraints. Declare
is a declarative language based on an extensible set of
constraints [87–89,93]. Declare supports most of the mod-
eling constructs mentioned in Tables 4–6 and hence a
good candidate to evaluate and illustrate the CFMs. The
compliance rules have been used as a reference model to
monitor a stream of events coming from the replay of Log
Part 2 (testing log).
The compliance rules from the BPIC 2011 and 2012 logs
are provided next. They are well suitable for a case study
as they nicely cover the CMFs. Specifically, they involve
quantitative and qualitative time, conditions on both case
and activity data as well as on resources. The compliance
rules from BPIC 2012 also refer to non-atomic activities
and activity lifecycle. Furthermore, some of the presented
rules can become conflicting for some specific cases.
Compliance Rules Discovered from the BPIC 2011 Log:
Through the Declare Maps Miner plug-in of ProM, we have
extracted, from the training log derived from the BPIC
2011, the following compliance rules:R1 If “administratief tarief - eerste pol” occurs in a trace, it
is always preceded by “vervolgconsult poliklinisch”
and between “administratief tarief - eerste pol” and
“vervolgconsult poliklinisch” you cannot find another
“administratief tarief - eerste pol”;R2 If “administratief tarief - eerste pol” or “vervolgconsult
poliklinisch” occur in a trace, they always coexist;R3 If “aanname laboratoriumonderzoek” occurs in a trace,
it is always followed eventually by “ordertarief” and
vice versa if “ordertarief” occurs, it is always preceded
by “aanname laboratoriumonderzoek”;R4 If “administratief tarief - eerste pol” or “aanname labor-
atoriumonderzoek” occur in a trace, they always coexist;R5 If “aanname laboratoriumonderzoek” occurs in a trace,
it is never followed by “vervolgconsult poliklinisch”;Using the Timed Declare Miner plug-in of ProM, we
have derived:R6 If “administratief tarief - eerste pol” occurs in a trace, it
may be followed by “beademing - anesthesie - eerste
dag” only if from the occurrence of “administratief
tarief - eerste pol” at least 30 days and at most 35 days
have passed;R7 If “hemoglobine foto-elektrisch” or “aanname labora-
toriumonderzoek” occur in a trace, they always coexist
and their time distance is at most 1030 days and at
least 1 day;R8 If “telefonisch consult” or “vervolgconsult poliklinisch”
occur in a trace, they always coexist and their time
distance is at most 1035 days and at least 1 day;
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Fig. 3. Methodology for tool analysis.
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is always preceded by “vervolgconsult poliklinisch”
and “vervolgconsult poliklinisch” occurs at most
1030 days before “administratief tarief - eerste pol”;
Using the Data-Aware Declare Miner plug-in of ProM,
we have derived:R10 If “hemoglobine foto-elektrisch” occurs in a trace and
case attribute “Diagnosis Treatment Combination ID”
is equal to “495,326”, then “hemoglobine foto-elek-
trisch” is followed eventually by “ureum”;R11 If “natrium vlamfotometrisch” occurs in a trace and the
condition (over case attributes) “(Age Z71 && Treat-
ment code Z 803 && Diagnosis Treatment Combination
ID r394;725) J (Treatment code¼¼703 J Treatment
code¼¼803))” holds, then “natrium vlamfotometrisch”
is not followed eventually by “calcium”;R12 If “administratief tarief - eerste pol” occurs in a trace
and the condition (over case and event attributes)
“(Age r70 && Producer code¼¼SIOG) J (Diagno-
sis¼¼Maligne neoplasma cervix uteri && Diagnosis
code¼¼106))” holds, then “administratief tarief -
eerste pol” is followed eventually by “albumine”;R13 If “telefonisch consult” occurs in a trace and the condi-
tion (over case and event attributes) “(Treatment
code¼¼101) && (Producer code¼¼SGAL J Producer
code¼¼SGNA)” holds, then “alkalische fosfatase -kine-
tisch-” does not occur in the same trace.The same plug-in was used to extract additional
resources rules:R14 If event attribute “Section” is equal to “ Section 4” and
event attribute “Specialism code” is equal to “86”, the
activity is executed by “org:group¼¼General Lab
Clinical Chemistry”;R15 “bacteriologisch onderzoek met kweek -nie” is always
executed by “org:group¼¼Medical Microbiology”;R16 “cytologisch onderzoek - ectocervix -” and “histolo-
gisch onderzoek - biopten nno” are always executed
by “org:group¼¼Pathology”;Compliance Rules Discovered from the BPIC 2012 Log
Using the training log derived from the BPIC 2012, throughthe Declare Maps Miner, we have extracted the following
compliance rules:R17 “A_PARTLYSUBMITTED-complete” occurs exactly once
in all the traces;R18 “A_SUBMITTED-complete” occurs exactly once in all
the traces;R19 “A_PARTLYSUBMITTED-complete” is always immedi-
ately followed by “A_SUBMITTED-complete” and, vice
versa, “A_SUBMITTED-complete” is always immedi-
ately preceded by “A_PARTLYSUBMITTED-complete”;R20 “A_SUBMITTED-complete” and “A_PARTLYSUB-
MITTED-complete” are always the first two activities
in a trace;R21 The lifecycle “W_Afhandelen leads-schedule”,
“W_Afhandelen leads-start”, “W_Afhandelen leads-
complete” is always respected;R22 “W_Completeren aanvraag-schedule” is always fol-
lowed eventually by “W_Completeren aanvraag-com-
plete” and, vice versa, “W_Completeren aanvraag-
complete” is always preceded by “W_Completeren
aanvraag-schedule”;R23 The lifecycle “W_Beoordelen fraude-schedule”,
“W_Beoordelen fraude-start”, “W_Beoordelen
fraude-complete” is always respected;R24 “O_SELECTED-complete” is always followed eventually
by “O_CREATED-complete”, “O_CREATED-complete” is
always followed eventually by “O_SENT-complete”
and, vice versa, “O_SENT-complete” is always preceded
by “O_CREATED-complete” and “O_CREATED-com-
plete” is always preceded by “O_SELECTED-complete”;R25 “A_CANCELLED-complete” does not coexist neither
with “A_ACTIVATED-complete” nor with “A_REGIS-
TERED-complete” nor with “A_APPROVED-complete”
nor with “A_DECLINED-complete”;R26 “W_Beoordelen fraude-schedule” does not coexist
with “W_Wijzigen contractgegevens-schedule”; item
“A_ACCEPTED” and “A_DECLINED” do not coexist.Using the Timed Declare Miner plug-in of ProM, we
have derived:R27 “A_PARTLYSUBMITTED-complete” occurs at most 22 s
after “A_SUBMITTED-complete”;
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22 s and at most 2 days, 18 h, 29 min, and 28 s after
“W_Completeren aanvraag-schedule”.Additional rules about resources were derived using
the same plug-in:R29 “A_SUBMITTED-complete” and “A_PARTLYSUBMITTED-
complete” are always performed by the same actor;R30 “A_ACCEPTED” and “A_FINALIZED” are always per-
formed by the same actor;R31 “A_SUBMITTED” and “A_FINALIZED” are never per-
formed by the same actor;5.3.3. Compliance monitoring with MobuconEC
MobuconEC is a compliance-monitoring framework based
on a reactive version [94] of the Event Calculus [67]. As
described in [39,84], the approach has been exploited to
formalize the extension of Declare described in [74,84]. This
extensions support: Metric time constraints, which can be directly forma-
lized (together with qualitative time constraints) using
the explicit approach to time provided by the Event
Calculus (CMF 1: þ). Data and data-aware conditions, leveraging on the first-
order nature of the Event Calculus (CMF 2: þ). Resources, which are considered as special data (CMF
3: þ).8 https://www.inf.unibz.it/montali/tools.html.Non-atomic activities, which can be encoded in the
Event Calculus using additional data and dedicated
rules, as shown in [39] (CMF 4: þ). Notably, the
formalization in [39] directly support the possibility of
monitoring the lifecycle of activities (CMF 5: þ).
In fact, MobuconEC is able to express all compliance rules
from R1 to R28; the last three rules do not correspond to
any data-aware Declare pattern, so they are not directly
supported, but could be seamlessly modeled as Event
Calculus constraints as well.
Due to the presence of data and metric time-related
conditions, MobuconEC does not directly monitor the mod-
eled constraints, but expands them in their different
instances, each of which grounds the constraint on a
particular context [39]. Consequently, it provides fine-
grained compliance checking by analyzing the evolution of
each constraint instance (CMF 6: þ). In particular, at a given
time each active instance could be either satisfied, violated,
or pending, the last state meaning that the constraint
instance is currently violated, but can still be satisfied by
properly continuing the execution of the monitored process
(CMF 7: þ). In the graphical feedback provided to the end-
user, two visualization modes are correspondingly provided
for each constraint: a “summary view” in which all instances
are packed together, or an “expanded view” in which each
single instance is shown separately. These two possibilities
are shown in Fig. 4.
This fine-grained analysis of violations at the
constraint-instance level constitutes also the basis forquantifying the degree of compliance. For the time being,
only simple aggregation metrics are provided to give an
indicator about the “global health” of the system (CMF 10:
þ/).
The high expressiveness of compliance rules in Mobu-
conEC has the main drawback that only reactive manage-
ment of violations can be tackled: proactive management
would require to reason on the possible future continua-
tions of the current, partial trace by considering also data
and metric timestamps, which is undecidable (CMF 8: -).
Another limitation of the approach is that violations are
reported to the user without any additional inference
about the corresponding root causes (CMF 9: -).
The latest version of the core MobuconEC reasoner with
case-data support, implemented in Prolog, is publicly
available.8 The integration with the operational support
backbone of ProM is still ongoing.
5.3.4. Compliance Monitoring with MobuconLTL
MobuconLTL is a compliance-monitoring tool imple-
mented as a provider of the operational support in the
process-mining tool ProM. It takes as input a reference
model expressed in the form of Declare rules. More
generally, every business constraint that can be expressed
as an LTL formula can be monitored using MobuconLTL. A
stream of events encoded using XES can be monitored
with respect to the given LTL specification.
MobuconLTL [37,38] deals with a qualitative notion of
time (being based on LTL) but it does not support con-
straints concerning metric time. In this sense, MobuconLTL
partially supports CMF 1 (CMF 1: þ/). Therefore, rules
expressing qualitative time information (e.g., R1–R5, R17–
R26) can be monitored using MobuconLTL. On the other
hand, rules based on a quantitative notion of time (used to
define, e.g., deadlines) cannot be monitored (e.g., R6–R9,
R27–R28).
MobuconLTLmonitors finite-trace LTL constraints through
deterministic finite state automata. Therefore, it does not
tackle constraints referring to data and resources (ranging
over finite state) because of the state space explosion
problem (CMF 2: - and CMF 3: -). Therefore, rules involving
data and resources cannot be monitored (e.g., R10–R16, R29–
R31). With this approach, it is possible to express rules on
non-atomic activities (e.g., R17–R26) but it does not fully
support the monitoring of activity lifecycle. Indeed, with this
approach it is possible to associate an event type to each
occurrence of an activity. However, a correlation mechanism
to link different events belonging to the lifecycle of the same
activity cannot be defined (CMF 5: ). This is, again, related
to the impossibility for an automata-based approach of mon-
itoring constraints referring to data. Indeed, the most natural
way of implementing such a correlation mechanism would
be to connect events with the same value for a certain data
(e.g., an activity ID).
Fig. 5 represents how rules R1–R5 can be used to monitor
with MobuconLTL a case replayed from the BPIC 2011 testing
log. Fig. 6 shows the monitoring results obtained for a case
from the testing log derived from the BPIC 2012 log using the
Fig. 4. A compliance summary produced by MobuconEC when monitor-
ing a trace from the BPI Challenge 2011; some contraints are shown with
an expanded view listing the evolution of their instances.
L.T. Ly et al. / Information Systems 54 (2015) 209–234228compliance rules R17–R19, R21, R22, and R24. Events are
displayed on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis shows the
constraints. In particular, each line is labeled with the Declare
constraints used to encode the rules mentioned before. Five
states are possible for compliance rules: possibly satisfied,
possibly violated, satisfied, violated, and conflict. The first state
attests that the monitored case is currently compliant with
the rule but can violate the rule in the future. The second
state indicates that the compliance rule is currently violated,
but it is possible to bring it back to a satisfied state by
executing some activity in the future. The third and the
fourth states model permanent violations and satisfactions of
the rule. In this way, MobuconLTL implements reactive
monitoring (CMF 7: þ). It is possible, at runtime, to detect
that a state of affairs is reached such that two or more
compliance rules become conflicting (conflict state); the
presence of a conflict means that no possible future course
of execution exists such that all the involved constraints are
satisfied. In this sense,MobuconLTL also supports a pro-active
management of violations and root cause detection (CMF 8:
þ and CMF 9: þ). For example, in Fig. 5, when aanname
laboratoriumonderzoek occurs some of the constraints move
to a conflict state since some of them require the execution
of vervolgconsult poliklinisch to be satisfied and for others the
execution of this activity is forbidden.
MobuconLTL supports continuous monitoring and allows
a case to be monitored also after a violation or a conflict has
occurred as shown in Fig. 5. One trivial way to implement
continuous monitoring is to reset all the automata needed
for the monitoring when a violation occurs. Other more
sophisticated ways to implement continuous monitoring
are presented in [37]. Note that, in the visualization in Fig. 5,
different instances of the same rule are condensed in only
one line. After every violation and conflict a new instance of
the violated rule is started in the same line.
The automata-based approach allows MobuconLTL to
provide the user with detailed diagnostics about which
activities can be executed and which ones are forbidden at
any point in time during the process execution. This is
possible by evaluating which transitions can be fired from
the current state of the automaton and which ones bring the
automaton in an inconsistent state. The tool only supports
simple metrics for quantifying the degree of compliance of a
case [36] (CMF 10: þ/).
5.3.5. Compliance monitoring with SeaFlows
SeaFlows is a compliance checking framework that add-
resses design and runtime checking. It aims at encoding
compliance states in an easily interpretable manner to
provide advanced compliance diagnosis. The core concepts
described in [35,64] were implemented within the proto-
type named SeaFlows Toolset. With SeaFlows, compliance
rules are modeled as compliance rule graphs (CRG). Sea-
Flows enables to monitor a stream of events encoded in a
predefined event format. It further enables the import of
logs in XES standard format.
Qualitative time constraints are well-supported by Sea-
Flows. In particular, the CRG approach is not restricted to
L.T. Ly et al. / Information Systems 54 (2015) 209–234 229predefined compliance constraint patterns but allows for
constraints that are more complex. However, SeaFlows
does not address quantitative time (CMF 1: þ/). Hence,
constraints using metric time (e.g., R6–R9 and R27–R28)
are not supported.Fig. 5. Compliance monitoring with MobuconLTL: BPI Challenge 2011.
Fig. 6. Compliance monitoring with MSeaFlows only partially supports CMF 2 (CMF 2: þ/).
This is because it provides only limited support for con-
straints with non-unary data conditions. Resource-aware
compliance rules are only supported if the resource condi-
tions can be expressed via the supported data conditions
(CMF 3: þ/). Hence, conditions as required for the
resource-related constraints R14–R16 and R29–R30 are not
supported. SeaFlows supports both atomic as well as non-
atomic activities (CMF 4: þ) and constraints on the lifecycle
of activities like R21–R23 (CMF 5: þ).
For this case study, the logs were automatically replayed
and checked against all modeled rules. For each violation, a
violation file was created. Fig. 7 illustrates how compliance
with R5 is monitored by replaying the log of a specific case.
As compliance with a CRG is checked by executing it against
the event trace using well-defined rules, the compliance state
is represented through markings of the CRG. When a viola-
tion is observed, it is reflected in the markings of the CRG.
SeaFlows supports fine-grained compliance checking by
analyzing the individual constraint instances that occur
during the process execution (CMF 6: þ). In Fig. 7, two
instances of R5 were identified by the monitor (state VIOL-
ABLE in the Check Result panel in the screenshot). The states
of these instances are represented by the marked R5 shown
in the main panel in Fig. 7. From this state representation, it
is possible to derive information for providing pro-active
support in terms of guiding the process execution to avoid
violations (CMF 8: þ). How this can be done is described in
[64]. In the example, activity vervolgconsult poliklinisch is
associated with an absence node that is next to being
executed. Hence, this activity is prohibited and must not be
executed as its execution would lead to a violation.obuconLTL: BPI Challenge 2012.
Fig. 7. Monitoring with SeaFlows: detection of two violable activations of a compliance rule.
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nisch, is executed, both instances become violated as shown in
Fig. 8. The marked CRG serves as basis for deriving explana-
tions for violations (CMF 9: þ). In the example, clearly R5 is
violated because vervolgconsult poliklinisch was executed even
though it was prohibited after aanname laboratoriumonderzoek.
That is the reasonwhy the corresponding node is marked with
red color. Once violated, the instance of a compliance rule
cannot become satisfied in the further process execution. This
is because the violation is alreadymanifest in the log. However,
monitoring can still be continued for the compliance rule
(i.e., future possible violations of the rule in the process
instance can also be detected). Thus, SeaFlows supports
reactive compliance management (CMF 7: þ).
As the compliance monitor of SeaFlows was implemen-
ted as a proof-of-concept for the concepts described in [64],
it does not put emphasis on sophisticated visualization and
reporting features for compliance monitoring. Although the
compliance states of multiple compliance rule instances can
be aggregated to provide an overall compliance level, the
framework does not support a more detailed analysis of the
individual metrics (CMF 10: þ/). In addition, SeaFlows
does not detect violations caused by the interplay of two or
more constraints. Hence, the conflicts among some of the
rules in the case study (cf. Section 5.3.4) remain undetected.6. Conclusion
This paper presents a framework for the systematic
comparison of compliance monitoring approaches in the
business process management area. The framework consists
of ten Compliance Monitoring Functionalities (CMFs) and
includes requirements for the constraint modeling notation
(e.g., supporting time and data), requirements with respect to
the execution (e.g., supporting multiple constraint instances),
and user requirements (e.g., providing fine-grained feedback).
The CMFs are harvested based on a systematic literature
review as well as from five case studies from different
domains (health care, manufacturing, and maritime safety).
The appropriateness of the CMFF is shown in two ways.
First of all, the CMF framework is compared with existing
compliance patterns in the business process management
area. Secondly, existing compliance monitoring approaches
are classified based on their support for the CMFs. The
comparison with compliance patterns supports the impor-
tance of the four constraint-related CMFs, i.e., those CMFs that
relate to language and expressiveness aspects in the constraint
specification. The classification of existing approaches pointed
out that none of them supports more than seven CMFs and
most approaches are not supported by publicly available
software tools. Here we have to note that for some approaches
Fig. 8. Monitoring with SeaFlows: detection of compliance violations.
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literature. It seems that several approaches focus on a specific
language aspect rather than integral monitoring support. Less
attention has been devoted to user requirements, i.e., the
provision of fine-grained feedback or even the proactive
indication of compliance violations. Nevertheless, it is crystal
clear that users play an important role in compliance mon-
itoring, e.g., to interpret deviations.
In order to demonstrate the applicability of our CMF
framework, two realistic data sets from the BPIC 2011 and
2012 were applied using three compliance monitoring tools,
i.e., MobuconLTL, MobuconEC, and SeaFlows. The data sets
consisting of process execution logs from patient treatment
and the financial domain were divided into training and
testing data sets. Compliance constraints were harvested
based on the training set, implemented within the three
tools, and monitored over the testing data set. The applica-
tion of concrete tools to these data sets nicely illustrates how
compliance monitoring works in practice and shows what
the interaction with users looks like.
Let us now reflect on the four research questions
described in the introduction. RQ1: How to identify compliance monitoring approaches?
The systematic literature search and complementarycase studies helped us to identify typical functionalities
required in compliance monitoring. RQ2: What are functionalities that are essential for compli-
ance monitoring approaches in business processes? We
identified three essential classes of monitoring function-
ality, i.e., modeling, execution, and user requirements.
However, the CMFF is meant to be extensible, i.e., addi-
tional CMFs could become relevant and hence added or
existing CMFs might be split or merged. One candidate is
CMF 6: supporting multiple-instances constraints, which
refers to the multiple instantiation of constraints, but
might be also applied to multiple instances of the under-
lying process (i.e., covering inter-instance constraints as
dealt with in, for example, [100]). RQ3: How can we demonstrate the appropriateness of the
identified compliance monitoring functionalities? Real
event data have been used to illustrate and test the
CMFF. However, a real-life case study involving real-time
monitoring is still missing. To address this research
question better, we need to find a case study where
we can embed our monitoring tools in an operational
information system. RQ4: How can the compliance monitoring functionalities be
applied in existing tools? Three tools were used to demon-
strate the practical realization of our CMFF. The choice of
L.T. Ly et al. / Information Systems 54 (2015) 209–234232the tools was motivated by availability and experience
with the tools. A more comprehensive demonstration
using additional tools (realizing different approaches)
would be useful and balance the viewpoint on the CMFF.
For this, the BPI data sets ([11,12], download via DOIs)
together with the constraints provided in this paper
constitute an available data set that could be used to
benchmark compliance monitoring approaches and tools.
For a further evaluation of the CMFF, studies with experts
from practice are envisaged, e.g., by brainstorming ses-
sions or interviews to assess the appropriateness of
the CMFF.The work can be further extended in several directions,
e.g., to cross-organizational or configurable processes. An
interesting area of adaptation/extension of the CMF frame-
work here presented naturally arises when there is the
need of a comprehensive compliance evaluation not just
within, but also across process cases. Traditionally, business
processes are monitored in a case-by-case manner. How-
ever, compliance rules may span across cases, e.g., because
they focus on resources independently from the specific
case in which they operate, or because they need to
compare and combine data produced inside different cases.Acknowledgments
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